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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), UTAH 
CODE ANNOT. Plaintiff/Appellant (hereafter MHarlinew) originally filed this appeal with the 
Utah Supreme Court, but that court poured this matter over to this Court on February 20, 1992. 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED FQR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants/Appellees 
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Barker") herein set forth their Statement of Issues 
Presented for Review. 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that there were no material issues of fact when 
Harline failed to controvert Barker's Statement of Undisputed Facts and failed to produce record 
evidence in support of each of the elements of his claims against Barker? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that Barker should not have been 
compelled to reveal attorney work product during the discovery period? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Addendum A). 
Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Harline commenced this action by filing a complaint against Barker on November 8,1990. 
(R. 2-8). The complaint contained essentially two claims of legal malpractice against Barker, 
arising out of Barker's representation of Harline during a bankruptcy proceeding initiated by 
Harline in February 1986. Harline complained that Barker had a duty to amend certain 
schedules that Harline had already filed in his bankruptcy proceeding before Barker began 
representing him. Harline claims this failure caused two harms. The first alleged harm was that 
Harline was denied a discharge of his debts in bankruptcy. (R. at 3-4). The second alleged 
harm was that Harline's interest in his profit sharing plan was denied an exemption from his 
bankruptcy estate, thus making those funds available to Harline's creditors. (R. at 3-4). 
On October 29, 1986 the bankruptcy court ordered Harline to amend his bankruptcy 
schedules in conjunction with the conversion of his bankruptcy case from one in Chapter 11 to 
one in Chapter 7. The deadline for doing this was November 18, 1986. (R. at 5, 246). Harline 
claimed that if Barker had amended his bankruptcy schedules in the Fall of 1986, the bankruptcy 
court would not have denied his discharge, and would have determined that Harline's interest 
in his profit sharing plan was exempt from his bankruptcy estate property. 
On January 28, 1992, Harline served document production requests and interrogatories 
on Barker seeking, among other things, the identity of Barker's trial witnesses and exhibits. (R. 
at 17-18, 216-18). Barker timely responded to Harline's discovery requests and answered all 
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but two of the interrogatories, in spite of the fact that he objected to many more than two. (R. 
at 216-226). Harline brought a motion to compel responses to all interrogatories to which 
Barker objected, even though Barker had responded to all but two of the interrogatories. (R. 
at 212-215). After opposing the motion and pointing out that the only information Barker 
withheld was attorney work product, the trial court denied Harline's motion to compel. (R. at 
231-7, 349). 
On March 8, 1991, and in response to Harline's claims in opposition to Barker's motion 
for summary judgment, the trial court ordered that all non-expert discovery would be completed 
by June 3, 1991. (R. at 190, 240). On June 24, 1991 Barker filed his Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants'Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 242-333). On 
July 5, 1991, Harline filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 355-379). Harline failed to controvert Barker's Statement of Undisputed Facts 
as required by Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. (R. at 385-6, 355-
65). Further, Harline's counsel filed no affidavit under Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. On July 16, 
Barker filed his Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 382-404). 
On July 29, 1991, the trial court heard argument on Barker's motion for summary 
judgment. On August 16, 1991, the trial court entered its order granting Barker's motion for 
summary judgment and entering judgment against Harline herein. (R. 430-431). On September 
9, 1991, Harline filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. at 437-8). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 14, 1986, Harline filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. (R. at 245, 263-5). On the date of his filing, 
Harline owned an account at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. In the month following 
his bankruptcy petition filing, Harline received a total of $38,634.27 from post-bankruptcy 
petition sales of stock from his Merrill, Lynch account. He used these monies to pay for his 
personal expenses without first obtaining bankruptcy court approval to do so. (R. at 248, 295). 
On March 21,1986, after receiving and improperly using these monies, Harline signed and filed 
his bankruptcy schedules and statements. In filing his schedules and statements, he swore a false 
oath. (R. at 249, 296, 299-301). Harline intended to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors 
at the time he swore to the truth of his bankruptcy schedules. ]&. Because of Hthe significant 
number of wrongful acts and the reckless indifference to the truth showed by Wesley G. 
Harlinew at the beginning of his bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court later denied his discharge 
in bankruptcy on August 10, 1988. I£. 
In the early Fall of 1986, Harline knew that his bankruptcy schedules were deficient. 
Harline never communicated that information to Barker. (R. at 246, 280-2, 284-6, 314-5). On 
October 29, 1986, the bankruptcy court ordered Harline to amend his schedules by November 
18, 1986. (R. at 5, 246). On December 12, 1986, Bettie Marsh, who had been Harline's 
bankruptcy counsel since June 9, 1986, withdrew as Harline's counsel. (R. at 247, 274-5). On 
December 31, 1986, Barker was retained by Harline to represent him in his bankruptcy 
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proceedings. (R. at 247, 280-2, 284-6). On July 10, 1989, Paul Cotro-Manes entered his 
appearance as counsel to Harline in his bankruptcy. (R. at 249, 309, 326). 
On April 26, 1990, Harline filed amended bankruptcy schedules and statements, 
identifying his interest in his profit sharing plan as property which he claimed should be exempt 
from his estate and thus unavailable to his creditors. (R. at 249, 329). The bankruptcy trustee 
objected to the amended schedules and to the claimed exempt status of Harline's interest in his 
profit sharing plan. (R. at 249, 329). On October 9, 1990, the bankruptcy court allowed 
Harline's schedules to be amended. (R. at 249, 331). On November 9, 1990, the bankruptcy 
court sustained the bankruptcy trustee's objections to the exempt status of Harline's interest in 
his profit sharing plan, thus making those monies available to Harline's creditors. (R. at 250, 
332). 
Harline appealed the bankruptcy court's determination that his interest in his profit sharing 
plan was not exempt, which appeal was ultimately successful when the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the U.S. District Court's affirmance of the 
bankruptcy court's decision. In re Harline. 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991). The exempt status 
of Harline's interest in his profit sharing plan will depend on whether it meets the legal and 
factual requirements of ERISA. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal by recognizing that the problems 
Harline experienced in his bankruptcy proceedings were caused solely by his own fraudulent 
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conduct, and were a function of the nature of his interest in his profit sharing plan. This Court 
may ignore Harline's arguments that there were factual issues about the dates of Barker's 
representing him in bankruptcy court because those facts are not material. One of the elements 
of a legal malpractice claim is that the alleged negligence of the attorney proximately cause the 
harms complained of. Because the bankruptcy court's treatment of Harline was based on facts 
completely independent of Barker's conduct or representation of Harline, the causation element 
of Harline's claims was unsupported by any evidence presented by Harline to the trial court. 
Harline did not controvert or make known any evidence to support his claims that his ills in 
bankruptcy were caused by any negligence of Barker. To the contrary, the uncontroverted facts 
(deemed admitted by Harline) show that he was denied his discharge because he defrauded his 
creditors. Also, the uncontroverted facts show that his profit sharing plan's exempt status will 
depend entirely upon whether it meets ERISA. 
Even if this Court were to assume that a 1986 amendment of Harline's schedules would 
have changed the treatment he received from the bankruptcy court, summary judgment was 
appropriate for two other independent reasons. First, bankruptcy case law holds that an attorney 
has no duty to amend bankruptcy schedules to which a client has already attested, particularly 
if the client has not communicated known problems to his attorneys. Second, Harline is 
equitably estopped from claiming that Barker should have been aware of and cured false 
statements when Harline was knowingly responsible for the falsity of those statements. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's ruling denying Harline's motion to compel. 
Because trial was made unnecessary by the absence of factual issues, compelling Barker to 
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disclose trial witnesses and exhibits makes no sense. Trial courts have wide latitude in discovery 
matters, and Harline showed no abuse of discretion. Finally, because the trial court correctly 
dismissed all of Harline's claims against Barker, this Court should affirm the judgment, with 
costs to Barker. 
ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE WERE NO 
MATERIAL FACTUAL ISSUES. 
Barker agrees with the law cited to this Court by Harline that the existence of material 
factual issues precludes summary judgment. But the only factual issue really identified by 
Harline in his brief is the issue of when Barker began his representation of Harline in Harline's 
bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court filings make clear that Barker was not Harline's 
attorney between the alleged critical dates of October 29, 1986 and November 18, 1986. This 
Court may even assume that Harline's claims that Barker represented him during that time raise 
a factual issue. But that begs the question of whether that factual issue is material. The timing 
of Barker's representation of Harline is not material. 
There are essentially three independent grounds supporting the trial court's summary 
judgment, and those grounds apply even if this Court makes the necessary factual inferences in 
favor of Harline by finding that Barker began representing Harline sometime before November 
18, 1986. First, the harms Harline complains of were not caused by Barker. Second, Barker 
had no cognizable duty to amend schedules to which Harline had attested and about which 
Barker knew of no deficiencies. Finally, Harline is equitably estopped from claiming Barker 
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should have cured Harline's own lies. For these reasons, the single issue raised by Harline does 
not preclude affirming the summary judgment. 
B- HARLINE FAILED TO PRESENT RECORD EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ALL 
OF THE ELEMENTS OF HIS CLAIMS. 
Discovery concluded on June 3, 1991, more than two weeks before Barker submitted his 
supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment. Harline's 
opportunity to amass evidence supporting his claims had passed, and he was obligated to come 
forward with evidence supporting each of the elements his claims against Barker. Harline's 
failure to produce evidence in opposition to Barker's motion entitled Barker to the summary 
judgment. 
In Celotex v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the United States Supreme Court outlined the 
burden of a plaintiff in response to a defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the 
entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and 
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that 
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact,M since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law" because the non-moving party has 
failed to make a sufficient showing of her case with respect to 
which she has the burden of proof. 
I& at 322-23 (emphasis added). This Court recognized this principle in Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health. Inc.. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. Ct. 1987). In other words, Harline must 
8 
establish the existence of all of the elements necessary to recover on his claim for legal 
malpractice against Barker in order to avoid summary judgment. 
The elements of a claim for legal malpractice are: 
1. An attorney-client relationship; 
2. A duty of the attorney to the client; 
3. A breach of that duty; and 
4. Damages suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach of 
duty. 
Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988). Seg alSQ, Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 
799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). The fact of an attorney-client relationship does not fulfill 
Harline's evidentiary burden. In legal malpractice cases, proximate cause embraces an 
assessment of the underlying cause of action. Williams v. Barber. 799 P.2d at 889. "Generally 
speaking, incurring liability through a breach of duty does not necessarily result in damages/ 
M. In this case, there was a complete failure of proof on the issue of causation. 
1. Harline's False Oath. Not Any Failure To Amend. Resulted In His Denial 
Of Discharge, 
Judge Allen of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah could not have been 
more clear in his August 10, 1988 ruling denying Harline his discharge in bankruptcy. At the 
very outset of his ruling, Judge Allen indicated that the operative date was February 14, 1986, 
nearly a year before Barker became involved in Harline's general bankruptcy affairs. (R. at 
292). Judge Allen found that on March 21, 1986, again months before Harline alleges Barker 
became involved, Harline knowingly and fraudulently swore a false oath regarding his assets on 
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February 14, 1986. No amendment by Barker can or could have cured the fact that Harline lied 
under oath. In addition to the false information contained in Harline's schedules, Judge Allen 
was also critical of Harline's liquidating his stocks (which were property of the estate) and using 
the money without authorization. No amendment to Harline's statements and schedules by 
Barker could undo that improper conduct. 
Harline presented no evidence that Judge Allen would have allowed Harline his discharge 
in bankruptcy if the schedules had been amended. Harline's subjective beliefs of fault do not 
constitute any evidence of proximate cause. Harline determined not to depose Judge Allen on 
the discharge causation issue, and Harline's attorney did not file an affidavit under U.R.C.P. 
56(f) claiming he needed more time to do discovery on the issue. In fact, time for discovery 
had lapsed. Finally, Harline admitted Barker's Statement of Undisputed Facts by failing to 
controvert them as required by Rule 4-501(2)(b) U.C.J.A. Harline simply failed to produce any 
record evidence or hope of any evidence tending to show that Barker's failure to amend 
Harline's false statements and schedules proximately caused the denial of Harline's discharge 
in bankruptcy. Therefore, this Court should affirm summary judgment in favor of Barker. 
2. Harline Cannot Prove That Amending The Schedules Would Have 
Resulted in Exempt Treatment For His Pension Plan. 
Harline claims that Barker should have amended his schedules to include certain 
purportedly exempt properties, and that Barker's failure to amend the schedules resulted in Judge 
Allen's sustaining the bankruptcy trustee's objection to Harline's exempt property claims. This 
claim is ironic, in that Harline's present counsel, Mr. Cotro-Manes, amended Harline's 
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schedules to include the exempt property, to no avail. The bankruptcy court allowed Harline's 
desired amendment, but denied the exempt treatment Harline sought for reasons totally unrelated 
to Barker. Now, Harline apparently claims that if only the schedules had been amended by 
Barker earlier than they were amended by Cotro-Manes, the subsequent denial of exempt 
treatment would have been avoided. This argument is without merit, especially in light of the 
Tenth Circuit's determination that the profit sharing plan may very well be exempt from 
treatment. A factual determination must be made regarding the nature of the plan. 950 F.2d 
at 676. In any event, Harline came forward with no evidence that an earlier amendment of 
Harline's schedules would have made a difference. Harline came forward with no evidence to 
suggest that an amendment by Barker would have had any more positive effect than Mr. Cotro-
Manes' efforts. Therefore, Harline cannot lay the blame for his ills at Barker's feet, and this 
Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment. 
B. BECAUSE BARKER HAD NO DUTY TO AMEND HARLINE'S SCHEDULES 
AND STATEMENTS. HARLINE'S CLAIMS FAIL. 
In addition to Harline's failure to create a material issue of fact on causation, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's summary judgment because as a matter of law, Barker had no duty 
to amend Harline's false schedules. Without a duty, there can be no claim for negligence. "A 
finding of negligence requires the presence of certain elements, one of which is a duty running 
between the parties.H Hughes v. Housely. 599 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted). 
There was no such duty here. 
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Harline's alleged grounds for avoiding summary judgment are unavailing for the simple 
reason that no bankruptcy attorney has the legal duty to cure his client's falsified schedules and 
statements particularly when he is unaware of their falsity. In a bankruptcy case nearly identical 
to Harline's bankruptcy, In the Matter of Dawson. 446 F.Supp. 196 (E.D. Mo. 1978), a 
bankruptcy judge had denied an application for attorneys' fees made by the attorney for a 
bankrupt. In Dawson, the attorney for the debtor had entered his appearance months after the 
bankruptcy had been commenced. The bankruptcy judge had, prior to the attorney's appearance, 
ordered the debtor to amend certain of his schedules. In explaining the necessity of the 
amendments, the bankruptcy judge stated: 
Such amended schedules were ordered because the schedules 
originally filed were deficient, in failing to accurately disclose the 
kind and character of the bankrupt's assets at bankruptcy. 
. . . 
P]t is the duty of the bankrupt, primarily, to file schedules which 
truthfully state his assets, and debts, at bankruptcy. 
Id. at 197-198. The new attorney, after helping his client amend his schedules, filed a fee 
application, including an application for payment for time spent preparing amended schedules. 
The bankruptcy judge denied the application for those fees, finding that the services rendered 
by the attorney in amending the schedules were not "compensable services/ 
On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri affirmed the 
bankruptcy judge's denial of fees, ruling that because the bankruptcy attorney had no legal duty 
to amend the schedules, the estate had no obligation to compensate him for those services. 
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Compensation is limited to services involving the performance of 
"legal duties rather than . . . [the exercise of] legal privileges/ 
[Citation omitted] 
M. at 199. 
Applying the rationale of Dawson to the facts of this case, even if this Court ignores the 
certified bankruptcy documents and Barker's Affidavits establishing the non-existence of an 
attorney-client relationship between Harline and Barker during the Fall of 1986 (R. at 280-86), 
and even if this Court accepts as true the self serving verified complaint and irrelevant affidavit 
of Harline's counsel, Barker had no legal duty to amend Harline's bankruptcy schedules and 
statements. In the absence of a legal duty, there can be no claim for negligence. S££, Hughes. 
supra. In light of this, there are no material facts precluding this Court from affirming the trial 
court's summary judgment. 
C. HARLINE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment for the additional reason that 
Harline's claims against Barker are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Harline never 
informed Barker of the falsity of his statements and schedules. Under Utah law, a litigant is 
barred from complaining about someone's acts or omissions when those acts or omissions are 
in reliance upon that litigant. The elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(i) [A] statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with 
a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken 
or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, QT failure 
JQ act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
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Ceco v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
Applying this test to the undisputed facts of this case, Harline was aware in September, 
1986 that his bankruptcy statements and schedules were deficient. He never communicated that 
information to Barker. That failure constitutes a failure & a& which resulted in Barker's 
reasonably relying upon the fact that Harline's statements and schedules were verified, on file, 
and that nothing need be done to them. Allowing Harline to now disavow both his oath upon 
signing those documents and his silence when he was aware of the deficiencies will injure Barker 
to the extent this lawsuit is permitted to continue. Therefore, Harline should be estopped from 
claiming that Barker should have amended Harline's schedules, and summary judgment should 
be affirmed. 
D. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING DENYING 
HARLINE'S MOTION TO COMPEL. 
This Court may ignore Harline's appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to 
compel Barker to identify his trial witnesses and exhibits. Harline's Motion to Compel appeared 
to address broader questions than it really did. In responding to Harline's 17 interrogatories, 
Barker gave complete answers to all but Interrogatories No. 2 and 5. (R. at 217). Those 
interrogatories sought only the identity of trial witnesses and exhibits. Although Barker objected 
to numerous other interrogatories, Barker provided information notwithstanding those objections 
and without waiving them. Barker never quite understood the basis for Harline's Motion to 
Compel, since Harline had all of the factual information he requested. The only information 
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Barker did not provide were answers to Harline's questions about attorney work product. There 
was no pre-trial order requiring disclosure of trial witnesses and exhibits, and absent an order 
of the court, the selection of witnesses and exhibits is a function of his counsel's mental 
processes and is protected by the attorney work product privilege. As the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Utah pointed out in Uinta Oil Refining Co. v. Continental Oil Co.. 226 F. 
Supp. 495 (D. Utah 1964), the names of witnesses and exhibits are part of the MtrialH 
component, and need not be specifically set forth in response to interrogatories. Ijl. at 505. 
Harline's reliance upon the case of State Road Commission v. Petty. 17 Utah 2d 381, 412 
P.2d 914 (1966) is misplaced. A closer reading of that case reveals (1) that the trial court judge 
is afforded great latitude in resolving discovery disputes and (2) many factors must be taken into 
account before forcing a party to reveal its intended witnesses and exhibits. Finally, the Petty 
case dealt with expert witnesses, not lay witnesses as requested by Harline herein. 
The question as to whether interrogatories are subject to objection 
. . . is primarily for the trial court to determine. Because of this 
fact and his advantaged position in proximity to all aspects of the 
lawsuit, it is practicable and desirable that he J2S allowed 
considerable latitude and discretion in his rulings. . . . [T]he State 
is suing a private individual and undoubtedly has caused an 
appraisal of the property to be made. It seems both practicable 
and just that the court should be somewhat more liberal in 
directing answers to interrogatories than may be warranted in some 
other cases. This is particularly true in this situation where they 
are supposed to be experts. 
Id. at 918 (emphasis added). Therefore, the teaching of Petty is that this Court should recognize 
the trial court's closer proximity to the facts and circumstances of this case and affirm his 
judgment that at least in the discovery phase of this lawsuit, Barker was not obligated to identify 
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his intended trial witnesses and exhibits. Indeed, at that early stage of the proceedings, the 
likelihood of Barker's having actually selected witnesses and exhibits for trial was remote. In 
a summary judgment scenario, being deprived of the names of trial witnesses and exhibits can 
have caused no prejudice to Harline. 
The absence of factual issues makes Harline's appeal of the trial court's refusal to compel 
the production of trial witnesses and exhibits confusing and moot. Therefore, this Court need 
not even address the denial of Harline's Motion to Compel if it affirms summary judgment by 
finding that there were no material factual issues. If this Court determines to review the trial 
court's denial of Harline's Motion to Compel, it should affirm the trial court's ruling by holding 
that absent a court order, a party's intended witnesses and exhibits for trial are attorney work 
product, and need not be provided in response to discovery requests. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Barker respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
summary judgment of the Third District Court. 
DATED this (Ofy/fay of June, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Thonias E. Kay 
Mark O. Morris 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
Ronald C. Barker and Larry L. Whyte 
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I hereby certify that on the/^flday of June, 1992, four copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEES were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
4537 Tanglewood Drive 




Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 




Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
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partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment rewrote this rule to s,uch an extent that a 
detailed description is impracticable. 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of 
the proposed order" following "supporting doc-
umentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
in Subdivision (3)(b). 
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